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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF UTAH

*************
GEORGE RUPP, et al.,

)
)

Plaintiffs-Appellants,

)
)

vs.

)

CASE NO. 16270

)

GRANTSVILLE CITY, et al.,

)
)

Defendants-Respondents. )

*************
BRIEF OF RESPONDENTS
Grantsville City, et al.

STATEMENT OF THE NATURE OF THE CASE
The Appellants filed an action seeking declaratory and
injunctive relief to enjoin enforcement of Revised Ordinances
of Grantsville City, Chapter 22, Sections 31, 34 and 35 and
Chapter 28, Sections 13, 15 and 27.

The Appellants alleged

that City officials had misrepresented to them and other
citizens certain facts with respect to a bond election which
approved the issuance of general obligation bonds to help
pay the costs of constructing a sewer system in Grantsville.
The Appellants alleged that they relied upon these misrepresentations in supporting the bond election and that the enforcement
of the cited ordinances was contrary to the representations
made and denied them their rights of due process and the
opportunity to vote at an election fairly presented and also
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
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constituted a confiscation of their property without
compensation.
DISPOSITION IN THE LOWER COURT
This case was tried in the District Court of the Third
Judicial District in and for Tooele County with the Honorable
Ernest F. Baldwin, Jr., presiding.

After all the evidence

was presented and having allowed time for counsel to submit
memorandums, the Court granted the Respondents' Motion to
Dismiss which it had taken under advisement at the conclusion
of Appellants' case.
RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL
The Respondents seek to have the findings of the trial
court and its order based thereon upheld.
STATEMENT OF FACTS
Prior to November 3, 1970, the elected officials of
Grantsville City determined it to be in the best interests
of the citizens of Grantsville City to construct a municipal
sewer system.

Application was made for Federal grants to

help defray the costs of construction.

As a condition

precedent to receiving the Federal grants, it was necessary
for the City to adopt a mandatory connection ordinance.
This ordinance (Exhibit P-2) was adopted in 1969.
ordinance (Exhibit P-1) was adopted in 1955.

The water

The Federal

grants were obtained and the City called a special bond
election, which was held on November 3, 1970, in which the
voters approved the issuance of the bonds to help find the

-2-
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construction and maintenance of the sewer system.

Prior to

the bond election, the elected officials of Grantsville City
circulated a flyer (Exhibit P-3) in support of the bond
election.

Bids were let and awarded to various contractors,

and construction of the sewer system began.

After construction

was commenced, it was discovered that the consulting engineers
who designed the system had made a mistake with respect to
the number of lineal feet of sewer laterals for the sewer
system.

It was discovered that the actual number of lineal

feet of sewer laterals needed would be 24,000 feet rather
than the 6,000 feet originally anticipated.

To solve the

problem of paying for the additional footage of sewer laterals,
the elected officials of the City determined to increase the
connection fee to the sewer system from $250.00 to $350.00.
Letters were sent from the City advising citizens of the
mistake, and a public meeting to discuss the proposed solution
was advertised and held.
I

The public meeting was well attended

and a vote was taken on the proposed solution, which was

_I.

approved with only a few objections.

The City then increased

I

the connection fee from $250.00 to $350.00. Construction of
the sewer was completed and the citizens were advised that
connection to the system was available on December 4, 1972.
Letters were sent to the citizens (Exhibit D-5) relative to
the sewer system and payment of the connection fees.

Appellants

failed to pay the connection fee; and pursuant to the ordinance,
water service to their residences was discontinued.

Upon
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payment of the connection fee, water service was reinstated.
Each of the Appellants had made payment of the connection
fee, without paying tmder protest, by May 11, 1976.

On

September 1, 1977 the Appellants filed suit seeking declaratory
injunctive relief enjoining the enforcement of Revised
Ordinances of Grantsville, Chapter 22, Sections 31, 34 and
35 and Chapter 28, Sections 13, 15 and 26 and, also, seeking
an injunction to prevent the City from raising the connection
fee above $250.00 as against the Appellants.

The suit was

filed without making a claim against the City for refund of
the $100.00 collected over and above the $250.00 original
connection fee and without complying, in any way, with the
Governmental II!lI!lunity Act or with Utah Code Annotated, Title
10, Chapter 7, Section 77.
The Appellants alleged that on or about November 4,
1970 the City presented to the citizens a proposal for the
ftmding, construction and maintenance of a sewer system to
serve the City.

They alleged that the elected representatives

of the City made certain specific representations to the
Appellants, both orally and written, that the Appellants
relied upon the representations in supporting the bond
election.

They alleged that subsequent to the approval of

the bond issue, the City has sought to enforce the abovementioned ordinances, including the increased connection fee,

all of which they alleged was contrary to the representations
made to the residents.

The Appellants alleged that enforcement
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of the ordinances had been arbitrary and discriminatory,
violating their rights to equal protection and due process.
They alleged that enforcement of the ordinances, which was
in direct contradiction to the representations made prior to
the bond election, denied them due process, constituted a
confiscation of plaintiffs' property without compensation,
without notice, without a fair opportunity to be heard, and
without the opportunity to vote at a duly called election on
issues fairly presented to the residents.

They alleged that

as a result of their failure to connect to the sewer system,
the City caused their water service to be discontinued and
that the enforcement of the ordinances would cause the
plaintiffs undue hardship and irreparable harm.

The defendant,

City then filed an answer and the case was brought to trial
on December 15, 1978, after having been continued on October 30,
1978.

Some evidence was stipulated to and the plaintiffs

called one witness and the defendants called two witnesses.
On October 30, 1978 and December 15, 1978, the plaintiffs

stipulated that the adequacy of the design of the sewer
system would not be an issue at the trial and it was not
raised as an issue.

At the conclusion of the plaintiffs'

evidence, the defendant, City moved to dismiss the action on
three basis:

First, that the thrust of the plaintiffs'

action was that the defendant, City had made misrepresentations
of certain facts and the plaintiffs' evidence did not show
that they relied upon any of the purported misrepresentations.

-5-
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Second, that the case sounded in tort and deceit and based
upon the evidence presented that was in fact the thrust of
the action and that the City had not had its governmental
inununity waived as to such a case.

Third, that the evidence

did not establish that the payments made by the plaintiffs
were paid under protest.
The Court took the motion under advisement and it gave
counsel time to submit memorandums and the defendant, City
then presented its case.

At the conclusion of all the

evidence and after the time had run for the memorandums of
counsel to be submitted, the Court entered its Findings of
Fact and Order dismissing the case.

It is from this Order

that the plaintiffs have taken this appeal.
POINT I
THE CITY HAD AUTHORITY TO ENACT AN ORDINANCE
MAKING CONNECTION TO THE SEWER SYSTEM
MANDATORY
Utah Code Annotated, Section 10-8-15, 1953, as it read
when the mandatory hook-up ordinance was adopted, read:
"They may construct, maintain, and operate
waterworks, sewer collection, sewer treatment
systems, gas works, electric light works, telephone
lines or public transportation systems, or authorize
the construction, maintenance and operation of
the same by others, or purchase or lease such
works or systems from any person or corporation,
and they may sell and deliver the surplus product
or service capacity of any such works, not required
by the city or its inhabitants to others beyond
the limits of the city."
Utah Code Annotated, Section 10-8-38 read, in pertinent
part, when the mandatory hook-up ordinance was adopted:

-6-
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"Boards of commissioners, city councils
and boards of trustees of cities and towns may
construct, reconstruct, maintain and operate
sewer systems, sewage treatment plants . . . .
and all systems, equipment and facilities
necessary to the proper drainage, sewage and
sanitary sewage disposal requirements of the
city or town and regulate the construction and
use thereof.
-"Any city or town, for the purpose of
defraying the cost of construction, reconstruction,
maintenance or operation of any sewer system or
sewage treatment plant, may make a reasonable
charge for the use thereof."
Utah Code Annotated, Section 10-8-84, as in effect when
the mandatory hook-up ordinance was adopted, read:
"They may pass all ordinances and rules
and make all regulations, not repugnant to law,
necessary for carrying into effect or discharging
all powers and duties conferred by this chapter,
and such as are necessary and proper to provide
!or !he safety and ~reserve the health, and
Eromote the prosperity, improve the morals, peace
and good order, comfort and convenience.of the
city and the inhabitants thereof, and for-t~
protectioncif property therein; and may enforce
obedience to such ordinances with such fines
or penalties as they may deem proper; provided,
that the punishment of any offense shall be by
fine in any sum less than $300.00 or by imprisonment not to exceed six months, or by both such
fine and imprisonment."
While it is true that Utah Code Annotated, Section 108-38 was amended in 1971 to include language specifically
authorizing cities to enact mandatory hook-up ordinances, it
does not necessarily follow that cities lacked such authority
prior to that time.

Appellants cite Salt Lake City v. Towne

House Athletic Club, 18 Utah 2d 417, 424 P. 2d 442 (1967),
as authority for the proposition that the 1971 amendment of

Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

- 7-

Section 10-8-38 means that cities did not have the power to
adopt mandatory hook-up ordinances prior to that time. It is
true that "the enactment of subsequent legislation containing
a specific grant of power kindred to that contained in prior
legislation containing a general grant of power usually
suggests the conclusion that the later specific grant was
not included within the former general grant". Salt Lake City
v. Towne House Athletic Club, 18 Utah 2d 417, 421, 424 P. 2d
442, 445.

But the suggestion of that conclusion does not

compel the conclusion.

It is also recognized that the

passage of a statute expressly conferring power on a municipal
corporation does not necessarily preclude the pre-existence
of the power.

Hopkins v. Richmond, 117 Va. 692, 86 SE 139;

overruled on other grounds, Irvine v. Clifton Forge, 124 Va.
78, 97 SE 310.

The Supreme Court of this state has recognized

on two separate occasions the power of cities and counties
to adopt mandatory hook-up ordinances.

In Bigler, et al. v.

Greenwood, et al., 123 Utah 60, 254 P. 2d 843 (1953), the
Salt Lake County Commissioners had set up a sewer district,
construction project and a plan for financing the same.

The

plaintiffs filed in the Supreme Court an original proceeding
seeking an extraordinary writ to prohibit the commissioners
from going forward with the program.

One of the points the

plaintiffs attacked the program on was that the method of
financing would impose liens upon plaintiffs' property
without notice and thus denied them due process of law.

-8-
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-This was the point the Court decided the case on.

The

Court, in making its determination as to whether the method
of financing the project was a non-lien purely revenue bond
financing or one which created a lien upon the property,
noted that each householder within the district whose property
was within 200 feet of the sewer was under mandate of a
county ordinance to connect with the sewer.

Speaking of

this mandatory hook-up provision the Court said, "The ordinance
is unquestionably valid and enforceable.

The County Conunis-

sioners . . . may make and enforce . . . all such local.
sanitary regulations as are not in conflict with general
laws and.

.make such provision for the preservation of

health. .

as they may deem necessary . . . Such an ordinance

is undeniably proposed to protect the health and welfare and
is therefore a valid exerci'se of authority expressly conferred
under the police power."

Bigler, supra at 66-67.

The

statutes which the Court cited as giving the comnissioners
µower to adopt such an ordinance were Utah Code Annotated,
Sections 17-5-35 and 49.

These statues are similar in their

provisions to Utah Code Annotated, Section 10-8-84, which is
cormnonly known as the "General Welfare Clause" for cities.
In Bair v. Layton City Corporation, 6 Utah 2d 138, 307
P. 2d 895 (1957), the City of Layton enacted an ordinance
authorizing and directing the execution of a contract between
the City and the North Davis County Sewer District.

One

provision of the contract required the City to keep in
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
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force, at all times during the term of the contract, an
ordinance requiring all buildings and structures in the City
used for residential, commercial or industrial purposes and
which were within a reasonable distance of an established
sewer connection main, to be connected to such main.

In

speaking of this provision, the Court said, "There might be
some difference of opinion on whether some buildings are
within a reasonable distance from a sewer main, and a
reasonable distance from such main might be different under
some circumstances than under others, but it seems clear
that the City's governing body should have no difficulty in
enacting an ordinance which would fix a reasonable distance
from such main within which all the buildings and structures
designated in the contract must be connected with such
main."

Bair, supra at 149.

It should also be noted that Utah Code Annotated,
Section 10-8-38, as it existed at the time the city adopted
its mandatory hook-up ordinance, granted the city the power
to construct and to regulate the construction and use of the
sewer system.

The mandatory hook-up ordinance is a reasonable

regulation which was adopted to help defray the cost of
construction and maintenance and also to protect the health
and safety and to promote the prosperity of the city and its
inhabitants.
In conclusion, the city had authority tmder the case law
of this state and pursuant to its police power and power to
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construct and regulate the construction and use of sewers
within the city limits, to adopt a mandatory hook-up ordinance
prior to the time when Utah Code Annotated, Section 10-8-38
was amended in 1971 to expressly provide such power.

The

legislature in so amending that section was codifying and
clarifying what was already recognized as the state of the
law.
POINT II
THE BOND ELECTION WAS VALID IN THAT THERE
WERE NO MISREPRESENTATIONS CALCULATED TO
MISLEAD THE VOTERS
In the case of Ricker, et al. v. Board of Education of
Millard County School District, 16 Utah 2d 106, 396 P. 2d
416 (1964), the defendant, School Board, had determined to
have a school bond election.

The Board published, in a

local newspaper, a notice of the school bond election and a
copy of the official ballot.

In addition, it had printed an

explanatory brochure about the election and its purpose.
The brochure indicated, among other things, that the funds
generated by the bonds would be spent under two main categories:
high schools and elementary schools.

The brochure indicated

the main item in high schools would be a new combined junior
and senior high school at Delta, at a cost of about $1,250,000.00
and, additionally, that about $155,000.00 would be spent at
Millard High School.

It also indicated that there were

several proposals under consideration for construction and
remodeling of grade schools in the district but gave no cost
estimates for those projects.
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

-11-

The bond election carried and the School Board proceeded
to get a definite estimate as to the cost of the new school
at Delta.

It was discovered that the preliminary estimate

for that project was too low and the actual cost would be
$1,645,000.00 to $1,786,000.00.

The maximum amount of bonds

that the Board could issue, based on the 1964 assessed
valuation, was $1,935,000.00.

The plaintiffs brought suit

to prevent the Board from going forward with a project of
building the new school at Delta.

The plaintiffs' contention

was that the Board should not be allowed to use substantially
all of the money for the high school projects, leaving only
a small amount to meet the needs of the elementary schools.
The plaintiffs contended that to do otherwise would be a
violation of the condition upon which the public voted for
the bonds and a breach of faith by the Board in performing
their duties. The Board's position was that it was bound
only by the statutory notice and not by the statements in
the explanatory brochure and that if, in order for it to
properly discharge its duties, it needed a free hand to
spend the funds for the most pressing needs of the district
which it felt were the high school projects.

The District

Court ruled that the Board should allocate the money raised
by the bonds for the purposes stated in the brochure.

The

trial court added the sum of the high school project estimates
from the brochure, added 10% and set that as the limit to be
spent on those projects.

The Supreme Court, on appeal,
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-identified the question presented as "whether the plaintiffs .
. . can compel the defendant, Board, to use the money raised
in the bond election only in the amounts stated and for the
purposes specified in the brochure".

Ricker, supra at 419.

In answering this question, the Court said, "We do not
disagree with the idea that public officials should not be
allowed to make representations or publish materials deliberately
calculated to mislead the voters, and then escape responsibility
for their commitments with the excuse that such representations
were not part of the official notice".
418.

Ricker, infra at

The Court noted that the District Court concluded that

the representations were not made with intent to deceive or
mislead and that its publication did not constitute any
misrepresentation.

The Court further stated on this point:

"It is also true that if i·t were shown that there existed
~

~

~~

~~-

-~-

-~~

some actual deceit, fraud or corruption; or if the board was
acting outside the scope of its authority, or was so completely
failing to follow the course of its duties that its actions
could be classified as capricious or arbitrary, redress
might be had in the courts".

The Court concluded that the

Board's conduct could not be so classified and that the
proposed building could not be properly interferred with and
vacated the District Court's order.
In the instant case, the plaintiffs allege that the
elected officials of Grantsville City made certain representations, both oral and written, in order to facilitate the

-13-
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passage of the bond election and that the plaintiffs relied
upon said representations in supporting the bond issue.

No-

where is it alleged that the representations were deliberatelj_
calculated to mislead or that there existed some actual
deceit, fraud or corruption.

There is no evidence in the

record that there was any intent to deceive the plaintiffs
or any other voters with respect to the facts.

With respect

to the written and oral representations alleged, the only
evidence introduced and before the trial court was Fxhibit
P-3. There is no evidence in the record as to any oral
representations by any city official.
alleged the following representations:

Plaintiffs have
"(1)

The charge for

a resident to hook-up to the system would not exceed $250.00,
(2)

Residents with existing and acceptable septic tank

systems would not be required to connect to the sewer system,
and (3) A monthly service charge would be assessed only to
those residents utilizing the sewer system.
connected would not be charged".

Residents not

Complaint, paragraph 5.

reading of Exhibit P-3 reveals the following:

(1)

A

.Jith

T•

respect to the first allegation, the exhibit reads "Connection
Charge at $250.00.

.$170,000" indicating the amount antici-

pated to be raised by the connection charge.

Nowhere does

it state that the connection charge would not exceed $250.00.
Indeed, the fourth paragraph of the exhibit reads as follows:
"It is the best estimates (emphasis added) of the mayor and
city council, engineers and financial consultants that the

-14-
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i

essential facts of the project are as set out in the following
discussion."

The representation complained of is included

in that following discussion; (2)

There is no representation

that residents with existing and acceptable septic tank
systems would not be required to connect to the sewer system;
(3) The brochure did state that a monthly service charge
would be charged to all persons using the system and people
not connected will not be charged.
The trial court, based upon the evidence produced, made
the following findings:
"The plaintiffs did not support the bond election."
"That Exhibit P-3 did not misrepresent the facts related
to construction of the sewer system."

Findings of Fact,

page 4.
In this action the plaintiffs are seeking equitable
relief in the form of a permanent injunction enjoining the
respondent from enforcing certain sections of the Revised
Ordinances of Grantsville City.

The rule, as to matters of

fact in a case in equity, is that the Supreme Court may
review questions of fact as well as questions of law but
that the Findings of Fact will not be disturbed unless the
clear weight of the evidence is against them.

Peterson v.

Carter, 579 P. 2d 329; Corbet v. Corbet, 472 P. 2d 430;
Merrill v. Bailey and Sons, 99 Utah 323, 106 P. 2d 255. The
weight evidence does not preponderate against the findings
of the trial judge in this matter.

To the contrary, there
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is no evidence of any fraud or deceit or publication of
material deliberately calculated to mislead the plaintiffs
or any other voters.

The only evidence as to any conduct on

the part of any of the plaintiffs with respect to the
representations in Exhibit P-3 is the testimony of Mr. Fidler.
Mr. Fidler testified that he received a copy of Exhibit P-3.
Transcript, page 16, lines 21-28.

He was asked if he relied

on the information as being true and replied, "Yes".
Transcript, page 18, lines 1-5.

He then testified that he

did not vote for the bond election.

Transcript, page 19,

Mr. Fidler cannot therefore claim to have relied

lines 5-7.

to his detriment in supporting the bond issue, since he did
not support it.

There is no evidence in the record that any

of the other plaintiffs or any other citizens relied upon
Exhibit P-3.

Further, Exhibit P-3 does not, as has already

been pointed out, misrepresent the facts.

It states by its

own terms that it is the "best estimate" of those involved
in planning the sewer project.
One further point must be raised here.

The Appellants

seek an injunction against increasing the connection fee
above $250.00 as against them.

Each of them has paid the

$350.00 connection fee for each of the premises for which
they were responsible to pay.

The payments were not made

under protest, even if their counsel advised them to so pay
the fees.

The basis for seeking the injunction against

charging the Appellants more than $250.00 for the connection
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fee, is that it is contrary to the representations made
which Appellants allegedly relied upon.

This is in effect

.

an effort to recover $100.00 from the Respondent, City for
each connection fee paid, based upon a theory of misrepresentation. This type of action sounds in tort, specifically the
tort of deceit.

For this type of action, the city has immunity

under Utah Code Annotated, Section 60-30-1, et seq.
Salt Lake City, 527 P. 2d 651 (1974).

Rapp v.

The city raised this

defense in a timely manner.
POINT III
THE APPELLANTS' RIGHT TO EQUAL PROTECTION
OF THE LAW HAS NOT BEEN VIOLATED
Municipal ordinances adopted under state authority
constitute state action and therefore are within the coverage
of the Fourteenth Amendment.

Lovell v. Griffin, 303 U.S.

44, 82 L.Ed. 949, 48 S.Ct. 666 (1938).

This is not a case

involving a "suspect class" calling for "strict judicial
scrutiny" and a showing of a "compelling state interest".
Bolling v. Sharpe, 347 U.S. 497, 98 L.Ed. 884, 74 S.Ct. 693
(1954). Rather the test to be applied here in determining
whether the city's conduct violates Appellants' rights to
equal protection of the laws is whether the distinctions
bear a rational relationship to a legitimate objective
sought to be accomplished.

Foley v. Connelie, 55 L.Ed. 2d

287, 98 S.Ct. 1067 (1978).

In this case, the Appellants

only witness, Mr. Fidler, testified that the houses on the
South side of Main Street to the Tooele Junction, except
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two, are not connected to the sewer.

Transcript, page 15.

It was proferred and stipulated that Jay Frank Bonell, a
professional engineer, whose firm designed the system, would
testify that all persons who could connect to the sewer
system were connected, except for two.

That some residences

are not connected because of the cost of running the lines
to outlying areas of the city and that some are not connected
because the level of the main sewer line is higher than the
level of their basement and they could not connect without
installing a pump.

Transcript, pages 41-42.

Not compelling

persons to connect and not extending the sewer lines for
such reasons is certainly not arbitrary and capricious and
does bear a rational relationship to the objective to be
accomplished.

It is submitted, therefore, that the Appellants'

right to equal protection of the law has not been denied.
POINT IV
APPELLANTS' DUE PROCESS RIGHTS HAVE NOT
BEEN VIOLATED
Appellants claim that their constitutional rights to
due process were violated because the city caused their
water service to be turned off when they failed to pay their
connection fees.

The only evidence before the Court is that

Mr. Fidler's water service was terminated when he failed to
pay the connection fee.

That he paid the connection fee

without paying it under protest and water service was restored.
Their is no evidence that any other person's water service
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was terminated.

The evidence also shows that several letters

were sent to those who had not paid the connection fee,
including one which notifies the receiver that it is to be
deemed a final notice.
Appellants cite Koger v. Guarino, 412 F.Supp. 1375, as
authority for the proposition that the city cannot terminate
their water service without first having a hearing.

The

case is not directly on point with the instant case and can
be distinguished in several ways.

First, that case dealt

with terminating water service for non-payment of disputed
service charges.

This case involves a one time connection

fee and not a dispute over periodic service charges.

Second,

in this case the Appellants did not contend that they had
been billed in excess of what the ordinance permitted.

Nor

did they contend that they had not received credit for what
they had paid.

The Appellants admit that they did not pay

the connection fee.

There would have been no purpose in

having a hearing to adjust a charge when there was no dispute
as to how much the Appellants had paid or as to how much the
ordinance provided for th.e connection fee to be.

The only

dispute was whether or not the city could enforce the mandatory
hook-up provision of the ordinance and collect $350.00
rather than $250.00 for the connection fee.

These matters

could not be resolved in an informal hearing designed to
settle disputed service charges because the resolution of
those questions involve determination of questions of law
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calling for exercise of strictly judicial functions. Shea
v. State Tax Commission, 101 Utah 209, 212, 120 P. 2d 274.
Payment under protest and following the statutory procedure
therefore was Appellants' remedy.

Therefore, any hearing

would have been nothing more than an exercise in futility.
It should also be noted that Utah Code Annotated,
Section 10-8-38, as it existed when the city adopted the
mandatory hook-up ordinance, permitted cities to terminate
water service for non-payment of charges to the premises
served by the water.

It was pursuant to this statutory

authority and the ordinance that Appellant, Wilton Fidler's
water service was terminated.
POINT V
APPELLANTS CANNOT RECOVER THEIR CONNECTION
FEES BECAUSE SAID FEES WERE NOT PAID UNDER
PROTEST AND THE APPELLANTS DID NOT COMPLY
WITH THE PROVISIONS OF THE GOVERNMENTAL
IMMUNITY ACT OR UTAH CODE ANNOTATED,
SECTION 10-7-77
Appellants claim that they are entitled to a refund of
the moneys which they paid for connection fees regardless of
whether such fees were paid under protest.

As authority for

this proposition they cite Wilson v. Weber County, 100 Utah
141, 111 P. 2d 147 (1941).
Utah Code Annotated, Section 59-11-11, as in effect
when the Appellants paid their fees read:
"In all cases of levy of taxes, licenses,
or other demands for tublic revenue (emphasis added)
wnich is deemed unlaw ul by the party whose property
is thus taxed, or from whom such tax or license

-20-
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is demanded or enforced, such party may pay
under protest such tax or license, or any
part thereof deemed tmlawful, to the officers
designated and authorized by law to collect
the same; and thereupon the party so paying
or his legal representative may bring an
action in any court of competent jurisdiction
against the officer to whom said tax or license
was paid, or against the state, cotmty,
mtmicipality or other taxing tmit or whose
behalf the same was collected, to recover said
tax or license or any portion thereof paid
under protest."
The Appellants connection fee was a "demand for public
revenue" within the meaning of this statute and to recover
the same Appellants must pay tmder protest.

Wilson v.

Weber County, which Appellants claim relieves them of the
responsibility of paying tmder protest, was overruled in
Shea v. State Tax Commission, 101 Utah 209, 120 P. 2d 274,
where this court said, in speaking of the Wilson case, "That
case must be considered as overruled to the extent that
anything said in that opinion may be said to hold that a
tax, license or other exaction for public revenue (emphasis
added), not paid under protest, may be recovered because
collected tmder a statute subsequently held invalid."
supra at 213.

Shea,

The Court also stated at page 212 of that

opinion, "In cases in which legality or illegality of t:ax
sought to be recovered by taxpayer necessarily involves
determination of questions of law calling for exercise of
strictly judicial functions, payment under protest and
compliance with other provisions of the statutes afford the
exclusive remedy".
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Further it should be noted that not only did the
Appellants not pay the connection fee under protest, but
they also failed to comply with the Governmental Immunity
Act and Utah Code Annotated, Section 10-7-77 by timely
presenting their claim to the city.
CONCLUSION
The case law of this state is clear that the Respondent,
City, had authority to adopt a mandatory hook-up ordinance
pursuant to its police powers.

Such authority is also

implied in the power of the city to construct and regulate
sewers within the city limits.
The city's enforcement of the challenged ordinances has
not been arbitrary and capricious.

To the contrary, there

is a rational reason for not requiring those few premises
not connected to the sewer to connect and for not extending
the lines to those areas not presently served by the sewer
system.
The Respondent, City and its elected officials did not
misrepresent the facts about the sewer system or its cost to
the residents of Grantsville.

The brochure which Appellants

complain of by its own words describes the contents thereof
as the "best estimates" of those involved in planning the
project.

It was a mistake which was not discovered until

after construction of the sewer system was well under way
which occasioned the increase in the connection fee.
Furthennore, the Appellants' own evidence demonstrates that
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they did not rely on the brochure in supporting the bond
election.

There is no evidence at all of any deceit, fraud

or corruption calculated to mislead the voters on the part
of any city official.
The Appellants claim that the ordinance is unconstitutional
in that it allows for termination of water service without a
prior hearing.

The case Appellants cite in support of this

contention is distinguishable from the facts in the instant
case in several respects which have been discussed.

Further,

such termination is expressly authorized by state law.
The Appellants did not pay this "demand for public
revenue" under protest which is a prerequisite to bringing
an action to recover the same.

Further, the Appellants did

not follow the statutory procedure for presenting their
claim to the city and did not file this lawsuit in a timely
manner.
The decision of the trial court, in this case, is
supported by the evidence and the law and should therefore
be affirmed.

RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED this

/7~day of July,

1979.

~~
Attorney for Respondents

<

Attorney for Respondents
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